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THE HOPE VI PARADOX: WHY DO HUD’S
MOST SUCCESSFUL HOUSING
DEVELOPMENTS FAIL TO BENEFIT THE
POOREST OF THE POOR?
Matthew H. Greene*
INTRODUCTION
In February of 2008, the United Nations (―UN‖) Special
Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to an
adequate standard of living, and on the right to non-discrimination
in this context, along with the UN Independent Expert on minority
issues, issued a press release condemning the redevelopment of
public housing in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina.1 The
statement focused on the decision to replace demolished housing,
despite the fact that ―only a portion of the new housing units will
be for residents in need of subsidized housing and the remainder
will be offered at the market rate.‖2 For approximately 5,000
families who were displaced by the natural disaster, this
redevelopment plan amounts to a denial of the right to return to

* Law clerk, The Honorable Janis M. Berry, Appeals Court of
Massachusetts; B.A., Boston College (2003); J.D., Northeastern University
School of Law (2008). I would like to thank Professor Rashmi Dyal-Chand for
her insight, guidance and encouragement on this article.
1
Press Release, Office of the United Nations High Comm‘r for Human
Rights, UN Experts Call On United States To Protect African-Americans
Affected by Hurricane Katrina, U.N. Doc. HR08023E (Feb. 28, 2008)
[hereinafter UN Report], available at http://www.unog.ch (follow ―News and
Media‖ hyperlink, then ―Press Releases & Meeting Summaries‖ hyperlink, then
―Human Rights Mechanisms (Special Rapporteurs and Experts)‖ hyperlink, then
―Activities and Statements‖ hyperlink).
2
Id.
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their homes.3
The report stressed the severity of the deprivation to which
low-income tenants4 would be subjected:
The right to an adequate standard of living enshrined in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights includes the right
to adequate housing . . . . The inability of former residents
of public housing to return to the homes they occupied
prior to Hurricane Katrina would in practice amount to an
eviction for those who returned or wish to return.
International human rights law prohibits evictions from
taking place without due process, including the right of
those evicted to be given due notice and opportunity to
appeal eviction decisions. It also requires the authorities to
ensure that large-scale evictions do not result in massive
homelessness and to consult those affected on relocation or
alternative housing solutions.5
This UN Report draws attention to the serious problems
associated with replacing New Orleans public housing with mixedincome developments. Although limited to the post-Katrina
context, the UN Report identifies flaws that are common to public
housing redevelopment efforts across the country. Indeed, the
report inadvertently illustrates problems that are endemic in one of
the largest housing development projects that the Department of
Housing and Urban Development (―HUD‖) currently runs.
Federally financed housing projects are a major part of HUD‘s
effort to increase access to affordable housing free from
3

Id.
The term ―low-income‖ is a term of art used by the Department of
Housing and Urban Development to determine eligibility for subsidized
housing. Low-income limits are generally set at 80% of the area median family
income level, however these are often adjusted to account for other metropolitan
economic factors. See Fiscal Year 2008 HUD Income Limits Briefing Material,
available at http://www.huduser.org/datasets/il/il08/IncomeLimitsBriefing
Material.pdf (―The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) is
required by law to set income limits that determine the eligibility of applicants
for HUD‘s assisted housing programs.‖). For the purposes of this article, the
term ―poor‖ is interchangeable with the HUD definition of low-income.
5
UN Report, supra note 1.
4
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discrimination,6 constituting over 60% of HUD‘s total budget
request for 2008.7 HOPE VI8 is one of the programs that HUD
employs for funding public housing projects and, according to a
wide variety of commentators, it is one of the most successful. 9
The program is designed to replace substandard public housing
developments, which currently accommodate a uniformly poor
population, with refurbished units to provide housing to a
heterogeneous community with varied incomes.10 This type of
housing development is commonly referred to as mixed-income
housing.

6

See U.S. DEP‘T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., HUD STRATEGIC PLAN: FY
2006-2011 39 (2006) [hereinafter HUD STRATEGIC PLAN], available at
http://www.hud.gov/offices/cfo/reports/hud_strat_plan_2006-2011.pdf.
7
For FY 2008, HUD‘s total budget request was $35.2 billion, $21.3 billion
of which was earmarked for public and Indian housing. U.S. DEP‘T OF HOUS. &
URBAN DEV., FISCAL YEAR 2008 BUDGET SUMMARY 3, 6 (2007), available at
http://www.hud.gov/about/budget/fy08/fy08budget.pdf.
8
HOPE VI was created by the Departments of Veterans Affairs and
Housing and Urban Development, and Independent Agencies Appropriations
Act, 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-389, 106 Stat. 1571 (1993) (creating
Homeownership and Opportunity for People Everywhere Grants), approved on
October 6, 1992 by the 1993 Appropriations Act. See Harry J. Wexler, HOPE
VI: Market Means/Public Ends: The Goals, Strategies and Midterm Lessons of
HUD‟s Urban Revitalization Demonstration Program, 10 J. AFFORDABLE
HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 195 (2001) for a more detailed legislative
history.
9
See generally Gordon Cavanaugh, Public Housing: From Archaic to
Dynamic to Endangered, 14 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L.
228 (2005); Patrick E. Clancy & Leo Quigley, HOPE VI: A Vital Tool for
Comprehensive Neighborhood Revitalization, 8 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL‘Y
527 (2001); Eugene T. Lowe, Mayors Push for Housing, 13 J. AFFORDABLE
HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 319 (2004); Special Report, The Experience at
HUD, 13 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 280 (2004); Wexler,
supra note 8; Sean Zielenbach, Catalyzing Community Development: HOPE VI
and Neighborhood Revitalization, 13 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY
DEV. L. 40 (2003).
10
See U.S. Dep‘t of Housing and Urban Dev., About HOPE VI,
http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/programs/ph/hope6/about/ (last visited Oct. 29,
2008).
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Through HOPE VI, HUD disburses federal funding upon
completion of a specific plan by a local housing authority. 11 To
receive a grant, the plan must stress the unique characteristics of a
particular metropolitan area and demonstrate how the funds will be
used in a way consistent with that particular housing market.12
While the specific goals of each development vary based on the
particular characteristics of the area, HOPE VI strives to eliminate
the concentration of poverty by promoting mixed-income
communities and creating more habitable and safe living spaces for
residents.13 The hope is that, by meeting these two general goals,
the development will create an environment that encourages
behavioral changes in the poor and leads to steady employment
and upward mobility for low-income tenants.14 In reality, however,
projects funded by HOPE VI only accomplish these goals under
very specific circumstances that are difficult to replicate.
Moreover, in the majority of these developments, the burden for
providing low-income housing options is shifted from HUD to the
surrounding municipality. 15
11

See U.S. DEP‘T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., HOPE VI PROGRAM
AUTHORITY AND FUNDING HISTORY (2007), available at http://www.hud.gov
/offices/pih/programs/ph/hope6/about/fundinghistory.pdf.
12
Lynn E. Cunningham, Islands of Affordability in a Sea of Gentrification:
Lessons Learned From the D.C. Housing Authority‟s HOPE VI Projects, 10 J.
AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 353, 357 (2001).
13
Id.
14
See HUD STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 6, at 15–26. But see Andrea D.
Haddad, Subsidized Housing and HUD Projects: Economic Confinement on
Low Income Families, 31 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 243
(2005) (challenging HOPE VI‘s reliance on the causal influence of environment,
given that when poorer residents are placed in wealthier neighborhoods, they
still do not have the finances to take advantage of their new surroundings).
15
See Barbara L. Bezdek, To Attain “The Just Rewards of So Much
Struggle”: Local-Resident Equity Participation in Urban Revitalization, 35
HOFSTRA L. REV. 37 (2006). While recognizing the accuracy of the conclusions
drawn in Bezdek‘s article, this article focuses more particularly on public
housing tenants who rely on HUD for subsidized housing. In the case of these
tenants, the cure of HOPE VI ends up being as bad, or worse, than the disease.
Id. Furthermore, when HUD is no longer building units for subsidized tenants,
the displaced then have to rely on the surrounding municipality to provide
housing in an already stressed affordable housing market. Id. The further HUD
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Practice has shown that mixed-income housing, as a
philosophy for providing public housing, does not benefit the
targeted neighborhood or the municipality as a whole. The benefit
of HOPE VI funding is reaped, for the most part, by the private
investors who are recruited to leverage financing as a part of the
HOPE VI application and by residents in surrounding
neighborhoods who see their property values raised by a
systematic dispersal of their low-income neighbors. This
systematic dispersal leads to a physical revitalization of the public
housing units and a repopulation of the area by a mixture of
market-rate renters along with a small percentage of the original
subsidized tenants. HUD claims to use HOPE VI to ―demolish the
most severely distressed public housing and . . . replace [it] with
mixed income neighborhoods and developments.‖16 What is
omitted from this description is that very few subsidized former
tenants have to be invited back to qualify as a mixed-income
development that will still be eligible for federal public housing
funding.
By contrast, the negative impact produced by the difference
between HUD‘s stated goals and actual results is felt by ever larger
groups of people. Just as mixed-income housing is supposed to
benefit both public housing tenants and the larger metropolitan
area, as these goals become corrupted the effects are borne by the
greater population of the city, not only the displaced residents.
In Part I of this article, I identify the two prevailing schools of
thought to which HOPE VI critiques generally adhere. In the first
school are financial and organizational critiques, which discuss the
economic feasibility and sustainability of the program from a
developmental perspective. In the second are cultural and
individual critiques, which focus on how individual tenants are
affected. Each of these points of view has generated both positive
and negative reviews of HOPE VI, but few concentrate on the
financial benefits that should be reaped by individual tenants under
HOPE VI or the social impact that ensues with the dispersal of
strays from its responsibility to increase access to affordable housing for those
most in need, the more stress is placed on the city or the state to pick up the
slack. Id.
16
See HUD STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 6, at 22.
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public housing tenants and the correlating obligation on state and
municipal authorities to build structures for tenants that are not
included in the new development.
In Part II, I compare HUD‘s stated goals to the practical effects
of its programs, specifically in three developments that HUD has
hailed as great successes for HOPE VI. These examples show that
HUD‘s conception of post-revitalization success does not match
the goals upon which HOPE VI funding is premised. This inherent
incongruity can be traced back to two factors: flaws in the criteria
that are used to award grants, and the use of inappropriate criteria
to evaluate the development once it is repopulated.
In Part III, I analyze one development that has experienced
some of the successes that HOPE VI ostensibly strives for, and
identify factors that led to sustainable benefits for tenants as well
as the development as a whole. The catalyst in that development
was grassroots organization and support from the city rather than
HUD funding. Notably, neither of these characteristics factor
meaningfully into the HOPE VI application or subsequent
evaluation.
PART I—HOPE VI THROUGH TWO DIFFERENT LENSES
The mixed-income model has generated a number of positive
reviews because, unlike traditional public housing, it theoretically
decreases the concentration of poverty in metropolitan areas. More
particularly, HOPE VI is well received because, rather than
creating new housing units along the same substandard models that
existed before, the funding is used to demolish uninhabitable
public housing and rebuild structures that provide shelter while
fitting aesthetically into their respective cities. 17 These new public
housing developments are designed along the principles of New
Urbanist architecture and are meant to avoid isolating populations
of poor people, often minorities, in bleak projects with substandard
living conditions. 18 By using funds to revitalize distressed, high17

See Cavanaugh, supra note 9, at 232.
Robert C. Ellickson, Unpacking the Household: Informal Property
Rights Around the Hearth, 116 YALE L.J. 226, 275 (2006) (―New Urbanists, a
highly influential school of urban planners, feature conventional dwelling units
18
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density public housing stock and create attractive developments
that blend into existing neighborhoods, HOPE VI appeals to
advocates for public housing tenants as well as to the residents of
adjoining neighborhoods.19
However, this picture is neither as accurate nor as promising as
it may seem. The push to revitalize frequently comes into direct
conflict with the interests of tenants who inhabit the housing that
must be demolished.20 While HOPE VI is premised on an ability to
determine how many market-rate units have to be created in order
to change the culture of the development,21 tenant advocates are
concerned with the number of units that are being reserved for
subsidized renters.22 Oftentimes, a HOPE VI grant is approved
according to a proposal that attempts to minimize this conflict.23
During the implementation of the plan, however, this conflict
inevitably resurfaces and the public housing authority must make a

in their communities, but seek to enhance contact among neighbors by, for
example, including front porches and placing housing units close together.‖).
19
Wexler, supra note 8, at 203–08. This article draws from the experiences
of fellows from the Community Renaissance Fellows Program, a collaboration
between HUD and Yale University between 1997 and 1999. The fellows were
mid-career professionals chosen to focus on the transformation of public
housing through HOPE VI, as well as neighborhood change in general. Id.
20
Arthur M. Wolfson, Lost in the Rubble: How the Destruction of Public
Housing Fails to Account for the Loss of Community, 9 CHAP. L. REV. 51
(2005); see UN Report, supra note 1.
21
Elvin K. Wyly & Daniel J. Hammel, Islands of Decay in Seas of
Renewal: Housing Policy and the Resurgence of Gentrification, 10 HOUS. POL‘Y
DEBATE 711, 732 (1999), available at
http://www.fanniemaefoundation.org/programs/hpd/pdf/hpd_1004_wyly.pdf.
22
See Wolfson, supra note 20, at 64–65 (―[N]ew developments frequently
contain significantly fewer public units than old developments.‖).
23
Cunningham, supra note 12, at 356 (noting that HUD scores grant
applications according to five factors, one of which requires ―an optimal income
mix of one-third each for public housing, tax credit or other subsidized housing,
and market rate rental or home-ownership‖); see, e.g., Ehan Barlieb, HOPE VI
Revitalization Grants: Weighing the Costs and Benefits, and Considering a
Solution in the Context of Liberty City, Miami, 15 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 201,
205–06 (2007) (describing the mix of development in the Scott Homes Project).
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decision in favor of either the tenants or the residents of the
surrounding municipality. 24
This conflict of interest is at the heart of any examination of
HOPE VI.25 The different analyses are generally based on the
perspective of the author and can be broken down into two main
categories: those that judge the merits of the program from a
financial standpoint, and those that focus on the cultural impact on
individual tenants, families and communities that rely on public
housing. Furthermore, the critiques that examine the financial
viability of HOPE VI projects generally focus on the benefits and
drawbacks for HUD or private investors who contribute capital. On
the other hand, the critiques that adopt a cultural perspective focus
on the individuals and communities who are affected rather than
the principals who fund the developments.
A. Financial/Organizational Critiques
The underlying presumption in most of the financial and
organizational critiques is that it is impossible to construct an ideal
program that fulfills every housing need. 26 Assuming this is true, it
24

See, e.g., Barlieb, supra note 23, at 205–06; see also U.S. DEP‘T OF
HOUS. & URBAN DEV., HOPE VI DEMOLITION GRANT MANAGEMENT AND
MONITORING
FOR
FIELD
OFFICES
7
(2007),
available
at
http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/programs/ph/hope6/grants/demolition/gmmonito
ring.pdf (noting the contrast between procedures for reducing the amount of
units to be demolished, which requires a reduction of the HOPE VI grant, and
for demolishing other units than those that were proposed, which only requires
that the substitute units to be demolished meet the same requirements as those in
the proposal).
25
See Wexler, supra note 8, at 225 (―[O]ne of the central challenges of
HOPE VI is whether the PHA, subject to HUD guidance and oversight, can
fashion a local HOPE VI plan that balances the demands of a successful mixed
income development . . . against the needs of low income households that have
come to depend on public housing.‖); see also Bezdek, supra note 15, at 61–73
(discussing the effects of urban redevelopment on resident and discussing how
the costs of redevelopment are borne by residents while the benefits are reaped
by a small class of ―propertied citizens‖).
26
See, e.g., Kristen D.A. Carpenter, Promise Enforcement in Public
Housing: Lessons From Rousseau and Hundertwasser, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1073
(2002); Wexler, supra note 8, at 205 (―An economist of the Chicago school
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follows that the wisest course of action is to fund programs that
will provide housing to as many low-income renters as possible
while simultaneously remaining reasonable in economic terms for
the organizations and investors who fund the development. 27 This
is likely to make the program sustainable over a long term basis,
which is better than a more idealistic program that is less likely to
succeed in its goals.
Many mixed-income advocates praise HOPE VI because it
offers flexibility in financing options that other social services
programs do not.28 This flexibility enables the infusion of private
sector resources into distressed neighborhoods on terms that are
attractive to private investors.29 Not only is this seen as beneficial
for the tenants receiving public housing, but the program is also
politically attractive because it courts private investment while
providing a social service. 30

might put it more bluntly: we should tolerate some measure of inequity as a
matter of public policy in order to produce a greater benefit to the larger
community.‖); Zielenbach, supra note 9 (describing how HOPE VI is
unequipped to meet goals that would require an economic development program
and so should focus on the goals that can be accomplished through physical
redevelopment of real estate and the provision of educational and social
services).
27
See, e.g., Carpenter, supra note 26, at 1080; Wexler, supra note 8, at 205.
See generally Wayne Hykan & Eric Zinn, Leases in Affordable Housing
Transaction, 13 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 185, 189
(2004) (discussing the occasionally independent interests of the various parties
to a HOPE VI transaction and, in a wider affordable housing context, the
necessity for compromise).
28
See Special Report, supra note 9, at 302–03 (HOPE VI was originally
implemented as a temporary program, so regulations and restrictions were not
developed to constrain the funding possibilities); Clancy & Quigley, supra note
9, at 535–37; Hykan & Zinn, supra note 27, at 195.
29
Id.
30
Clancy & Quigley, supra note 9, at 538–39 (―Entrepreneurial mayors
view HOPE IV as an important tool with which to leverage private investment
in support of a larger neighborhood development agenda.‖); see also Special
Report, supra note 9, at 302 (―[Financial] flexibility is certainly a factor in the
outstanding involvement of the private sector in the HOPE IV mixed-finance
program.‖).
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Along with financing flexibility, there are claims that HOPE VI
is a success because it was developed as an experimental program,
and therefore rules and regulations were not developed to
artificially constrain financing arrangements and the method of
pursuing the goals of the programs. 31 In theory, this allows
community leaders and the local Public Housing Authority
(―PHA‖) to design a financing plan that is uniquely suited for their
metropolitan area. 32 Such plans can include federal funds as well
as private investment, with the hope that private investors will
continue to remain involved in the project to protect their financial
interest.33 This self-interested oversight is seen as a check against
bureaucratic incompetence. 34
However, there are also a number of negative critiques from
this organizational perspective. Many claim that the administrative
problems that often plague HOPE VI developments—from the
application phase, through the funding and rebuilding process, and
during the actual administration of the rebuilt development—are
inevitable products of the manner in which HOPE VI funds are
distributed.35 Specifically, these problems can be linked to
leadership voids and corruption at the local level. 36 Since local
leadership is vital to putting together the individualized financing
plans that HOPE VI applications seek, weakness in such leadership
has the potential to undermine the entire program. 37 A large part of
the debate over HOPE VI is dedicated to the degree of authority
which should be vested in local housing authorities and whether or

31

Special Report, supra note 9, at 302–03.
See id.
33
See generally id. at 302 (discussing the involvement of the private sector
as a reason for the success of HOPE VI).
34
Clancy & Quigley, supra note 9, at 535–36.
35
See, e.g., Cunningham, supra note 12; Michael S. Fitzpatrick, Note, A
Disaster in Every Generation: An Analysis of HOPE VI: HUD‟s Newest Big
Budget Development Plan, 7 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL‘Y 421 (2000);
Paulette J. Williams, The Continuing Crisis in Affordable Housing: Systemic
Issues Requiring Systematic Solutions, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 413 (2004).
36
See Clancy & Quigley, supra note 9.
37
Id.
32
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not local groups are best suited for implementing the social service
programs that HOPE VI often promises to provide. 38
The literature that adopts this perspective generally seeks to
make the administration of public housing funds a more efficient
process. Presumably, a more financially stable program will have a
higher chance of succeeding over a longer period of time.
Unfortunately, these critiques often assume that as long as money
is moving efficiently from funding to implementation, the best
interests of the recipients of public housing are being served. These
articles tend to lack a conception of the individuals who inhabit the
public housing developments.39 Furthermore, each development is
often evaluated over the life of the housing project.40 The fact that
the residents who inhabit the development are constantly in flux is
either overlooked or ignored. A separate group of articles focuses
much more exclusively on the perspective of the individual tenants
and examines whether or not the funding is creating any
identifiable benefit in the lives of tenants who rely on federally
subsidized housing.
B. Cultural/Individual Critiques
A common theme in the literature that focuses on the
perspective of the individual is that federal housing projects value
financial feasibility to the detriment of individual tenants. 41 There
is an even more pervasive argument that public housing in general,
and HOPE VI in particular, focuses on the politics and economics
of providing housing for the predominately minority tenants while
ignoring the organic cultural value of public housing communities
that have inherent worth.42 Some advocates claim that a legitimate
38

See Williams, supra note 35.
See sources cited supra note 26.
40
See infra text accompanying notes 115–28.
41
See Scott L. Cummings, Recentralization: Community Economic
Development and the Case for Regionalism, 8 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L.
131 (2004); Ngai Pindell, Is There Hope for HOPE VI?: Community Economic
Development and Localism, 35 CONN. L. REV. 385 (2003); Wolfson, supra note
20.
42
Pindell, supra note 41.
39
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culture of public housing exists that should be valued and
developed rather than destroyed to start again from scratch.43
However, any organic community that exists in a development that
is deemed distressed is automatically judged as valueless by HOPE
VI standards.44 From this perspective, HOPE VI is characterized as
an inherently destructive program which presumes that many
existing public housing developments are worthless, so funds
would be better spent destroying, rebuilding, and repopulating the
development rather than attempting to improve flawed but existing
communities from the ground up.45
From this foundation springs the criticism that funding is
allocated and evaluated on a development-wide basis rather than
looking at what is best for individuals and families who are
dependent on subsidized housing.46 There is an argument that,
while HOPE VI might create physical structures that remedy the
problem of poverty concentration and urban blight, the losses that
public housing tenants are forced to incur are hardly outweighed
by any benefits they eventually attain. Even HOPE VI advocates
will concede that some residents will have to be displaced via
Section 8 vouchers in order to create the desired mixture of
tenants,47 but they rely on the assertion that this program creates
the highest benefit for the largest group of people possible. 48 It is
questionable whether empirical data supports this assertion.49
43

See, e.g., Wolfson, supra note 20, at 54–62.
See generally Pindell, supra note 41, at 390, 415.
45
Id. at 437 (concluding that HOPE VI could have been used to overcome
past failures in public housing efforts, but that the primary motivation continues
to be ―revitalizing cities instead of the poor people within those cities‖).
46
See generally Pindell, supra note 41.
47
Section 8 Vouchers (officially renamed Housing Choice Vouchers in
1998) come with their own particular set of problems. See generally Cara
Hendrickson, Racial Desegregation and Income Deconcentration in Public
Housing, 9 GEO J. ON POVERTY L. & POL‘Y 35 (2002).
48
See Clancy & Quigley, supra note 9, at 531–32 (noting criticism
concerning shrinking stock of public housing ignores the fact that existing
public housing is inadequate).
49
See Paul C. Brophy & Rhonda N. Smith, Mixed-Income Housing:
Factors for Success, 3 CITYSCAPE 2, 3 (1997), available at http://www.huduser.
org/Periodicals/CITYSCPE/VOL3NUM2/success.pdf
(describing
how
44
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Although this replacement of public housing with mixedincome developments results in a decrease in the total amount of
public housing units, some argue that this is justified because the
existing units were uninhabitable to begin with.50 If developments
are razed and rebuilt with a percentage of the new units dedicated
for market-rate rentals, then fewer people are afforded subsidized
housing. HUD claims that the amount of units available to
subsidized tenants is not being decreased because any habitable
units that are demolished are replaced with revitalized structures,
and any units that are remade as market-rate rentals were
uninhabitable to begin with.51 Again, there is still an active debate
whether or not the empirical evidence favors this explanation. 52
HOPE VI attempts to counter these problems by ostensibly
requiring tenant input for the new development.53 In reality,
though, this is usually a meaningless gesture meant to minimize
negative attention on the project.54 In some cases, the ―tenant
input‖ is simply a rubber stamp that is supposed to validate the

anticipated results, even if present, are difficult to quantify). This is particularly
clear when the authors explain their lessons and hypotheses for further research
that emphasizes the difficulties in achieving the goals of HOPE VI and the
particularized circumstances that contribute to success. Id. at 23–28.
50
Clancy & Quigley, supra note 9, at 531; Williams, supra note 35, at
460–61.
51
Clancy & Quigley, supra note 9, at 531.
52
See e.g., Cavanaugh, supra note 9, at 236 (―[O]ne-to-one replacement of
demolished or disposed-of units . . . paved the way to the later rebuilding
successes of HOPE VI . . . .‖); Wexler, supra note 8, at 205 (refuting the
argument that public housing resources are being misallocated through mixed
income housing by advising that we ―tolerate some level of inequity . . . to
produce a greater benefit to the larger community‖); Williams, supra note 35, at
439 (noting the controversy surrounding whether HOPE VI replaced
deteriorated housing with ―a sufficient number of new units to house everyone
who was displaced).
53
Susan Bennett, „The Possibility of a Beloved Place‟: Residents and
Placemaking in Public Housing Communities, 19 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV.
259, 304 (2000); Cummings, supra note 41, at 142; Williams, supra note 35.
54
See sources cited supra note 53; see also Williams, supra note 35, at 463
(―There is apparently an assumption that the people‘s interests will be voiced
and protected by the institutional players.‖).
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project from the perspective of the nominal beneficiaries. 55
In fact, when HOPE VI builds a new community, it is usually
doing so by selectively choosing who will repopulate the units and
excluding many of the lowest-income tenants.56 Many of the
articles in favor of HOPE VI quote statistics that show higher
incomes relative to the mean for tenants after redevelopment, as
well as other group economic indicators.57 However, these
statistics fail to account for the tenant turnover, and often fail to
isolate the subsidized tenants when examining any increase in
wealth or decrease in poverty.58 There is no doubt that redeveloped
communities will boast better economic statistics, precisely
because they have been recreated as mixed-income communities.
That said, it remains to be seen whether any behavioral
characteristics are transferred between members of different
economic classes through proximity. Statistics that are offered for
such developments fail to address whether any benefit is being
reaped by low-income tenants.
Finally, HOPE VI is often accused of mirroring and
accelerating the process of gentrification because the developments
that fare the best in the application process also happen to be the

55

Bezdek, supra note 15, at 58; Audrey G. McFarlane, When Inclusion
Leads to Exclusion: The Uncharted Terrain of Community Participation in
Economic Development, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 861, 868 (2001).
56
Bennett, supra note 53, at 298–301; Florence Wagman Roisman,
Keeping the Promise: Ending Racial Discrimination and Segregation in
Federally Financed Housing, 48 HOW. L.J. 913, 918–19 (2005); see Cummings,
supra note 41, at 143 (noting the importance of gentrification in the approval of
Hope VI applications).
57
See, e.g., Zielenbach, supra note 9 (comparing eight HOPE VI
neighborhoods versus citywide statistics in 1990 along with the same data from
2000). This data is used to support the conclusion that neighborhood per capita
income increased over time in the HOPE VI developments relative to the city.
However, there is no indication that the author factored in the extensive tenant
turnover that takes place in a HOPE VI mixed income development. The change
from a predominantly poor development to a mixed-income development would
account for the higher per capita income without any evidence of low-income
tenants benefiting from the changed demographics.
58
Id.
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ones that are most likely to attract private investment. 59 Moreover,
in order to attract this private investment, the development plan
needs to push out subsidized renters and attract market-rate tenants
who will infuse cash into the neighborhood‘s local businesses. 60
Thus, HOPE VI‘s focus on attracting private investment renders
sustainable low-income communities less desirable grant recipients
than poor developments that are already being encroached upon by
expanding neighborhoods of wealthier residents.
The problem with critiques on these bases is that, while they
recognize the human element to these problems, they generally
ignore the very legitimate organizational problems that are most
likely to shape HUD and individual housing authorities‘ policies.
These articles generally set a baseline for how HUD should value
individual people‘s housing needs, but they fail to consider the
impact to the surrounding community or the feasibility of
implementing changes from the perspective of a federal program.
For the most part, these cultural and individual critiques find favor
with like-minded commentators, but fail to persuade the
government to make any meaningful changes to how public
housing funds are administered.
PART II—STATED GOALS VERSUS PRACTICAL EFFECTS
According to a HUD-published study,61 a HOPE VI
development will ideally meet the following goals:
The behavior patterns of some lower income residents
will be altered by emulating those of their higher
income neighbors. The quality of the living
environment, not housing quality alone, leads to
59

Cunningham, supra note 12, at 354–56 (―Because of the severe funding
limitations for major renovations, HUD developed the public/private partnership
approach to leverage the scarce public dollars needed to replace the worst
projects with significant private funding sources.‖); John A. Powell &
Marguerite L. Spencer, Give Them the Old „One-Two‟: Gentrification and the
K.O. of Impoverished Urban Dwellers of Color, 46 HOW. L.J. 433, 451–53
(2003).
60
See sources cited supra note 59.
61
See Brophy & Smith, supra note 49, at 6.
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upward mobility.
Nonworking low-income tenants will find their way
into the workplace in greater numbers because of the
social norms of their new environment (for example,
going to work/school every day) and the informal
networking with employed neighbors.
The crime rate will fall because the higher income
households will demand a stricter and better enforced
set of ground rules for the community.
Low-income households will have the benefit of better
schools, access to jobs, and enhanced safety, enabling
them to move themselves and their children beyond
their economic condition.62
I will refer to these four goals as follows: 1) behavioral
transference in the home; 2) behavioral transference in work
habits; 3) community enforced rules; and 4) proximity to better
schools and jobs. Unfortunately, few developments actually
accomplish these goals, and when they do it is generally because of
circumstances that arose outside of HUD‘s control. 63
Nevertheless, HUD lavishes praise on HOPE VI developments as a
successful example of public housing. 64 In this section I examine
three HOPE VI developments to identify how HUD defines
success. I then demonstrate how HUD‘s self-proclaimed success
stories fail to meet the aforementioned four goals.

62

Id. at 6.
See Fitzpatrick, supra note 35 (focusing on the Cuyahoga development
in Cleveland, Ohio and how it was able to succeed despite HOPE VI funding).
64
See U.S. Dept. of Hous. & Urban Dev., Hope VI: Community Building
Makes a Difference, Executive Summary (2000), available at
http://www.huduser.org/publications/pubasst/hope2.html [hereinafter Executive
Summary].
63
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A. Three Developments: The Disconnect Between HUD‟s
Conception of Success and the Goals of HOPE VI
1. Centennial Place – Atlanta
One development that HUD considers a success is the
Centennial Place development in Atlanta, Georgia. 65 This
development received a Blue Ribbon Best-Practices Award in
1998.66 In particular, HUD publicizes access to better schools, a
new police substation that has reduced crime in the area, and a new
YMCA community center as evidence of its success. 67 According
to HUD, this development is evidence that ―[p]ublic housing
communities can be effective training grounds for marginalized
citizens who want to become self-sufficient—and a catalyst for
revitalization of the larger neighborhood.‖68
However, the project has sparked criticism because the
development was only completed by pushing out the majority of
low-income tenants that had been living there. 69 The development
65

The Atlanta Housing Authority received a $42 million award in 1993 to
rebuild Techwood/Clark Howell into Centennial Place. The development was
completed just in time for the 1996 Olympics, which were hosted in Atlanta. See
News Release, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, HUD
Awards $35 Million Grant to Atlanta to Transform Public Housing, Help
Residents (Sept. 28, 2001), available at
http://www.hud.gov/news/release.cfm?content=pr01-086.cfm.
66
See Fitzpatrick, supra note 35; see also Henry Cisneros & Bruce Katz,
Keep Hope (VI) Alive, BROOKINGS (May 17, 2004), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/metro/20040517_metroview.htm;
Julia
VitulloMartin, Follow Atlanta Housing Model, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION,
(Aug. 24, 2006), available at http://atlantahousingauth.org/pressroom/index.
cfm?Fuseaction=printpubs_full&ID=151; Field Works, Best Practices: Model
Program and Databases, November/December 1999, http://www.huduser.org/
periodicals/fieldworks/1299/fworks3.html (description of John J. Gunther Blue
Ribbon Best Practices Award).
67
See Executive Summary, supra note 64 (describing ―[h]ow the
groundbreaking HOPE VI public housing revitalization program builds human
and social capital and restores urban neighborhoods‖).
68
Id.
69
See SUSAN J. POPKIN, ET AL., A DECADE OF HOPE VI: RESEARCH
FINDINGS AND POLICY CHALLENGES, THE URBAN INSTITUTE, THE BROOKINGS
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originally contained 1,081 subsidized units. After reconstruction,
the development was designed to have 900 units: 360 market-rate
rentals, 180 affordable rent units for moderate income tenants, and
360 public housing units.70 Only 12% of the residents living at the
site when the grant was awarded returned after reconstruction. 71
Five hundred families were given alternative public housing,
Section 8 vouchers or administrative assistance in finding housing,
while an additional 500 families were given no assistance. 72 The
Atlanta Housing Authority offers no data on their whereabouts.73
Despite the fact that HOPE VI was ostensibly funded in order
to help low-income residents, only one-third of the Centennial
Place units were reserved for public housing. 74 Moreover, those
reserved units were not required to be granted to the families who
had tolerated the distressed living conditions that justified HOPE
VI funding. 75 Thus, while the new development was praised for its
ability to attract market-rate renters and leverage private
investment while providing a more desirable living space for
public housing recipients,76 the goals of HOPE VI are not achieved

INSTITUTION (2004), available at http://www.urban.org/publications/411
002.html.
70
Jerry Portwood, Techwood Turnaround: Centennial Place Takes the
Sting Out of the Low-Income Stigma, CREATIVE LOAFING, Feb. 6, 2002,
available at
http://atlantahousingauth.org/pressroom/index.cfm?Fuseaction=printpubs_full&I
D=30 (―Some housing was lost in the process. As Techwood, the community
had close to 1,100 units, all for public housing tenants. Today, there are 900
units, with a third set aside for public housing tenants, who devote 30 percent of
their income to rent. But the ones who do live in Centennial Place seem to have
no complaints.‖); see also Hon. William Campbell, Urban Holism: The
Empowerment Zone and Economic Development in Atlanta, 26 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 1411 (1999) (essay written by former mayor of Atlanta); Sabrina L.
Williams, From Hope VI to Hope Sick?, DOLLARS & SENSE, July-Aug. 2003,
available at http://www.dollarsandsense.org/archives/2003/0703williams.html.
71
Pindell, supra note 41, at 437 n.121.
72
Fitzpatrick, supra note 35, at 443.
73
Id. at 442.
74
Portwood, supra note 70.
75
Id.
76
See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 70, at 1412.
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when the majority of subsidized tenants are not invited back to the
development. Behavioral patterns cannot be transferred in the
home or the work place when most of the subsidized tenants never
come into contact with the market-rate renters.
Furthermore, any community-enforced rules are likely to be
created by the new middle-income renters. The subsidized tenants
that are invited back become a minority in the new community,
and it is doubtful that they are given much of a role in creating or
enforcing any sort of community rules. Finally, while better
schools, a new police station and community center are signs of
progress, the low-income residents who were given alternative
public housing do not reap the benefits of these improvements. The
needs of most low-income renters were ignored in order to
maximize private investment and attract market-rate residents.
2. Townhomes on Capitol Hill – Washington D.C.
Townhomes on Capitol Hill illustrates yet another example
where low-income tenants have been disadvantaged by the
inherent tension between the interests of low-income residents in a
development and the desire to build a development that also
benefits the surrounding municipality. 77 This development is a few
blocks from the U.S. Capitol, in an area that has undergone
substantial gentrification over the last twenty years. 78 Due to the
area‘s desirable location, housing prices became inflated to the
point that no low-income renter could hope to buy or rent in the
area,79 heightening the need for an affordable alternative for people
on housing assistance.

77

See Cunningham, supra note 12, at 357–58 (discussing three other
DCHA projects having similar gentrifying effects); see also District of
Columbia
Housing
Authority,
HOPE
VI
Newsletter,
http://www.dchousing.org/hope6/index.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2008)
(offering DCHA‘s explanation for its goals through implementation of HOPE VI
funds and its self-appointment as a ―leader nationwide in the design and
execution of innovative and successful HOPE VI projects‖).
78
Cunningham, supra note 12, at 357.
79
Id.
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The HOPE VI funding in this project replaced 134 existing
public housing units with a mix of market-rate and subsidized units
as well as thirteen fee-simple, market-rate townhomes.80 Instead of
relying on public housing operating subsidies, the units were
designed to be internally subsidized. 81 For this purpose, the 134
public housing units were replaced with 67 units reserved for
families at 50% to 115% of median income, 34 for families at 25%
to 50% of median income, and just 33 for families at 0% to 25% of
median income.82
The District of Columbia Housing Authority (―DCHA‖)
promotes this development as a remarkable success. 83 The project
is praised for successfully integrating the higher income
community at its northern border with the lower income
community at its southern border,84 ―while receiving no subsidy
and maintaining a budget surplus.‖ 85 The success of the mixedincome structure is further publicized by evidence that the marketrate units sold very quickly and that the DCHA continues to
receive calls from interested purchasers. 86
Unfortunately, this development served as the last push out for
the few remaining low-income tenants in the area. The project
ultimately succeeded in building only a few units for the most
heavily subsidized renters. Lynn Cunningham, a professor of
clinical law at George Washington University Law School and one
of nine commissioners on the governing board of the DCHA,
summed up the disparate results:
From the perspective of the few former residents who get
the opportunity to own a lovely new co-op home, the
project is a great success. From the perspective of the
80

District of Columbia Housing Authority, Ellen Wilson/Townhomes on
Capitol Hill, http://www.dchousing.org/hope6/ellen_wilson_hope6.html (last
visited Oct. 29, 2008).
81
See id. (providing a breakdown of the number and type of housing in this
development‘s cooperative structure).
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
District of Columbia Housing Authority, supra note 80.
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approximately 20,000 low-income households on the
waiting list for DCHA housing or Section 8 vouchers, it
looks like another tool in the hands of the area‘s gentrifiers
to reduce the number of affordable units. 87
Much like the Centennial Place development, it is difficult to
see how subsidized tenants will attain the goals of HOPE VI when
they are not invited to return to Capitol Hill. Behavioral
transference, community enforced rules and proximity to better
resources all require that a tenant actually be invited to reside in
the new development. What made the Capitol Hill development
even more deleterious to low-income renters is that it actively
hastened the gentrification that was reducing their housing options
initially. 88 The goals of HOPE VI are, at best, only achieved by the
small minority of subsidized renters who were allowed to return.
These goals, though, were nearly impossible to meet given the
active effort to transform the area so that low-income residents
were not able to live there at all.

87

Cunningham, supra note 12, at 357.
See Powell and Spencer, supra note 59, at 453 (―[E]ven if it admits the
negative effects of its strategies, the government believes that higher property
taxes resulting from gentrification will eventually be redistributed, for a net gain
for everyone. But with the current budget deficit, drastic cuts in services, and tax
cuts for corporate capital, this does not seem plausible. In fact, rather than
describing gentrification as creating ‗islands of renewal in seas of decay,‘ Wyly
and Hammel believe it is best described as leaving behind ‗islands of decay in
seas of renewal.‘‖). But see J. Peter Byrne, Two Cheers for Gentrification, 46
HOW. L.J. 405 (2003). Byrne claims that gentrification, though it reduces the
stock of affordable housing options, is actually beneficial for poor and ethnic
minorities because this reduction in housing is due to the failure of government
to secure affordable housing more generally rather than the fault of
gentrification. Moreover, since gentrification attracts more affluent residents,
there is a greater opportunity to aggressively finance affordable housing. This
contention is debatable at best because, among other things, the ability to
finance affordable housing through a greater tax base is rarely met with the
desire to do so.
88
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3. Plan for Transformation – Chicago

In 1995, due to the Chicago Housing Authority‘s (―CHA‖)
disastrous record, HUD took over day-to-day control of Chicago‘s
public housing.89 In the ensuing four years, HUD and the city
collaborated to use HOPE VI grants, along with other funding
resources, to drastically overhaul public housing in Chicago in
accordance with a mixed income strategy. 90 In 1999, after HUD
withdrew from controlling the CHA, the new administration
unveiled the Plan for Transformation, a system-wide blueprint that
continued to depend on HOPE VI grants and proposed massive
redevelopment along mixed income principles. 91 The plan, in most
cases, called for developments to consist of one-third public
housing, one-third affordable housing and one-third market-rate
homes.92
As part of the Plan for Transformation, the CHA agreed that all
displaced residents would have a right to return; however, the plan
provides no guarantee that all residents would be able to take
advantage of this right.93 Once HUD funding was secured, the
CHA wrote into the Leaseholder Housing Choice and Relocation
Rights Contract that reoccupancy rights would only be granted to
residents who were lease-compliant as of October 1999.94 In
89

Larry Bennett, Restructuring the Neighborhood: Public Housing
Redevelopment and Neighborhood Dynamics in Chicago, 10 J. AFFORDABLE
HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 54, 57 (2000).
90
Id.
91
Id. at 58; Chicago Housing Authority, The CHA‘s Plan for
Transformation, http://www.thecha.org/transformplan/plan_summary.html (last
visited Oct. 29, 2008). See generally William P. Wilen, The Horner Model:
Successfully Redeveloping Public Housing, 1 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL‘Y 62 (2006).
92
The CHA‘s Plan for Transformation, supra note 91.
93
See Chicago Housing Authority, The Relocation Rights Contract for
Residents Who Lived in CHA on 10/1/99, [hereinafter Relocation Rights
Contract], available at www.thecha.org/relocation/files/rights_for_moving_out_
10-1-99.pdf; Sudhir Venkatesh & Isil Celimli, Tearing Down the Community,
SHELTERFORCE ONLINE, Nov.-Dec. 2004, Issue 138, available at
http://www.nhi.org/online/issues/138/chicago.html.
94
See Relocation Rights Contract, supra note 93; Venkatesh & Celimli,
supra note 93 (―According to contract, in order to be lease-compliant, a public
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Stateway Gardens, a development on the South Side, 955
families—58% of the development‘s population—had already
moved out on their own before that date because of what the CHA
has acknowledged as ―deplorable conditions.‖95 Rather than
acknowledging that tenants who left because they could no longer
bear the miserable conditions were probably most entitled to the
benefits of the new development, the CHA took their voluntary
move as an opportunity to guarantee housing to fewer subsidized
renters. This way, CHA could lower the number of mandated
public housing units while maximizing market-rate and affordable
rate units.
Moreover, after October 1999, the CHA found cause to evict
906 families citywide who will no longer be eligible for
replacement public housing.96 For example, Gwendolyn Hull, a
resident of Stateway Gardens for thirteen years, purposely stopped
paying her rent in February of 2000.97 She documented her
deplorable conditions, including water damage, leaks, rats and no
hot water, among other problems. 98 However, the CHA evicted
Gwendolyn and her three young children despite its obvious failure
to maintain the apartment complex. 99 Evicting residents on bases
such as these further decreased the amount of public housing units
the CHA had to provide after redevelopment without violating the
formal terms of its agreement.
Not only were tenants given the unenviable choice of staying in
uninhabitable apartments or relinquishing any right to return to
their community after redevelopment, but many families were
evicted by the CHA after October 1999, thus forfeiting any right to

housing tenant should: 1) be current with rent or be in a payment agreement, 2)
have no utility balance with the CHA or be in a payment agreement, 3) be in
compliance with the CHA lease, and 4) have a good housekeeping record.‖). See
generally, Chicago Housing Authority, Understanding Relocation,
http://www.thecha.org/relocation/overview.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2008).
95
Alex Kotlowitz, Where is Everyone Going?, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 10, 2002,
available at http://www.alexkotlowitz.com/03_03.html.
96
Id.; see generally Venkatesh and Celimli, supra note 93.
97
Kotlowitz, supra note 95.
98
Id.
99
Id.
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reoccupy anyway. 100 While the new CHA developments have been
commended for their aesthetics, they house an entirely different
population than the one that endured the conditions that justified
HUD intervention. Three of HUD‘s four goals, behavioral
transference at home and at work, and proximity to better schools
and jobs, cannot possibly be met when the redevelopment efforts
include minimizing the rights of tenants to return. Furthermore, the
fourth goal, community enforced ground rules, seemed to be
entirely overlooked when the CHA unilaterally imposed a contract
that framed tenants‘ rights in its own favor.
B. Lessons Learned
HUD offers these three HOPE VI projects as successful models
from which to build. In reality, however, low-income tenants have
no opportunity to attain the stated goals of the program when they
are not invited back after redevelopment. This discontinuity
between goals and effects is endemic of a much larger problem in
the administration of public housing, a problem touched upon by
the UN Report condemning redevelopment efforts in post-Katrina
New Orleans. 101 While HUD is tasked with providing housing
options for those that cannot afford them, HUD funding does not
always benefit those most in need.
HOPE VI is one program in particular where many subsidized
tenants are worse off after redevelopment, while other groups, such
as neighboring property owners, reap the benefits. Ultimately,
100

See Wilen, supra note 91 (comparing the redevelopment of the Horner
public housing development on Chicago‘s Near West Side, planned as a result
of a class action lawsuit by the tenants, versus the CHA‘s Plan for
Transformation, which applies to other public housing under the CHA and is
funded in large part by HOPE VI, which minimizes the protection of residents‘
interests).
101
See UN Report, supra note 1 (suggesting that international human rights
law prohibits evictions without due process and requires authorities to ensure
that large-scale homelessness does not result). HUD publicizes the benefits of
HOPE VI without acknowledging that these benefits are not realized by the
majority of those displaced. Depending on the fate of those not invited back to
any particular development, this could match the severity of the human rights
issues in post-Katrina New Orleans.
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HOPE VI fails to benefit the people that HUD is supposed to be
assisting. This failure is inherently tied to biases in the application
for HOPE VI grants and the mechanisms that HUD uses to
evaluate performance at individual developments.
1. Flawed Application Process
The first inherent flaw in HOPE VI is the process by which the
grants are awarded. Each application for HOPE VI funding is
examined on a scale of five weighted factors:
(a) the ―capacity of the PHA to carry out the project (20
pts)‖;
(b) the ―need for revitalization of a property,‖ including
whether the property is severely distressed (20 pts);
(c) the ―soundness of approach,‖ in other words, how
appropriate it is in the context of the local housing market
(40 pts);
(d) the amount of private investment that will be leveraged
into the new project (10 pts);
(e) the ―quality of coordination and community planning
for the development,‖ (including cooperation with city
agencies and supporting community groups) (10 pts). 102
The third factor (and, as a correlative, the fourth because the
amount of private investment is often an indicator of the financial
soundness of the project) is given the most weight and can
accordingly make or break a project‘s application. ―Soundness of
approach,‖ for the purposes of the evaluation, generally refers to
criteria including the appropriateness of the project in relation to
other private non-subsidized housing projects that were created in
the area.103 Thus, applications are weighted towards their
likelihood of success on financial grounds rather than whether they
are the most appropriate use of resources for those most in need. 104
102

Cunningham, supra note 12, at 355–56.
Id.
104
Robert Solomon, Notes From the Inside: Thoughts About the Future of
Public Housing, 10 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 34, 38
(2000) (―Simply stated, I believe that HUD, in seeking to score applications as
103
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The de facto result is that areas that are already experiencing
gentrification are the ones that receive HOPE VI funding because
those are the areas most likely to attract private investment and
market-rate residents.105
A study commissioned by the Fannie Mae Foundation used
field observation, Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data and HOPE
VI plans to analyze gentrification trends in eight cities for the
fiscal years 1993 through 1998 that had received HOPE VI
grants.106 The authors concluded that success in HOPE VI projects
hinged on an ability to attract market-rate residents, and that areas
that have gone through the natural effects of gentrification are most
likely to attract sufficient numbers of market-rate residents.107
These residents are more likely to be drawn in when they ―do not
feel threatened by the proximity of poor families‖ in
neighborhoods that have already gone through an initial class
transformation. 108 This trend can be seen particularly clearly in the
Townhomes development in Washington D.C. 109 Success in that
project has been framed as its ability to attract market-rate
residents who are willing to live alongside public housing
tenants.110 The DCHA has glossed over the fact that fewer public
housing options are offered to tenants who depend on public
objectively as possible, has created a system that places form over function and
rewards grantsmanship more than need. As a result, HOPE VI has spawned a
small industry of consultants to prepare HOPE VI applications, with total fees
exceeding $100,000, and, I am told, reaching $250,000.‖). Solomon was the
Interim Executive Director of the New Haven, Connecticut Public Housing
Authority at the time his article was published. Id.
105
See Cunningham, supra note 12, at 358–59 (―Based on the scoring
system for the award of HOPE VI grants, it is apparent that traditional public
housing properties with a few hundred units that are located in or near a
gentrified neighborhood are more likely to be targets for near extinction than
candidates for sustainable low-income communities.‖). See generally Bennett,
supra note 53; Wexler, supra note 8.
106
Wyly & Hammel, supra note 21 at 741.
107
Id. at 741.
108
Id.
109
See Cunningham, supra note 12, at 357.
110
Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Thinking Regionally About Affordable Housing
and Neighborhood Development, 28 STETSON L. REV. 577, 591 (1999).
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housing, instead highlighting what it views as a successful class
transformation.
The federal government, through mixed-income housing, has
taken the private investors model for dispersing low-income
renters and put it to use with the backing of federal funds. 111 With
this federal backing, a HOPE VI application can override the
prevention mechanisms that state and local governments have put
in place to prevent gentrification. 112 HOPE VI projects make a
point of leveraging private investment, but in doing so they
necessarily cater to the goals of private investors.113 This shifts the
focus from providing housing to those in need to creating housing
developments that are financially sustainable. 114 In doing so, HUD
disregards its responsibility to provide for individual renters who
depend on housing subsidies when those needs come into conflict
with economic feasibility.

111

Cunningham, supra note 12, at 356; Powell & Spencer, supra note 59,
at 451 (―The Department of Housing and Urban Development, (―HUD‖), once a
barrier to gentrification, now emphasizes privatization, integration of assisted
and market-rate housing, and reliance on the ‗virtues of the market process . . .
[to further] socially desirable goals.‘‖) (quoting Elvin K. Wyly & Daniel J.
Hammel, Housing Policy, and the New Context of Urban Redevelopment, 6 RES.
IN. URB. SOC. 217, 218 (2001)).
112
State and local authorities take steps to limit the adverse effects of
gentrification through zoning regulation, subdivision control, and rent control, to
name a few. These efforts are designed to stop private investors from taking
advantage of low-income residents in order to turn the property into more
profitable market-rate housing. See Bezdek, supra note 15, at 64–65 (arguing
that local governments often will pursue revitalization strategies that hasten
gentrification, believing that the increased property values will lead to increased
property tax revenues). But see Byrne, supra note 88 (arguing that empirical
evidence that gentrification harms poorer populations is inconclusive, and in
some circumstances gentrification can bring about positive effects for the poor
while reinvigorating a municipality).
113
See Solomon, supra note 104, at 38–39; Salsich, supra note 110, at 588–
94.
114
See Pindell, supra note 41, at 397–98 (contending that HOPE VI is
calibrated to operate to the benefit of the ―working poor‖ while largely casting
out those in most desperate need of subsidized housing).
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2. Inappropriate Evaluation Criteria

HUD additionally demonstrates its shifted priorities in the way
in which it evaluates public housing management. The Public
Housing Management Assistance Program (―PHMAP‖) grew out
of the problems that HUD was having in evaluating the individual
PHAs across the country that are responsible for the day-to-day
management of public housing developments. 115 Since 1992, the
PHMAP is composed of twelve indicators that are used to
determine how successfully PHAs were managing their
developments, and by implication, how efficiently HUD funding is
being used. The twelve factors include:
1) Maintaining a high occupancy rate
2) Modernizing the stock
3) Collecting rents
4) Using energy efficiently
5) Preparing and leasing vacant units
6) Responding to requests for maintenance
7) Inspecting units and systems annually
8) Keeping tenant accounts receivable low
9) Maintaining appropriate levels of operating reserves
10) Keeping operating expenses within resources
11) Carrying out a program of Resident Initiatives
12) Maintaining a capacity to develop additional units 116
The problem with these indicators is that they are all unit- or
development-based, rather than tenant-based.117 No attention is
115

U.S. DEP‘T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., MANAGEMENT CASE STUDY:
PUBLIC HOUSING MANAGEMENT ASSESSMENT PROGRAM (1996), available at
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/npr/library/studies/casehuda.pdf.
116
Id. at 8.
117
Bennett, supra note 53, at 298 (―The HOPE VI program, and the
QHWRA that formalized many of its features into law achieve a contradiction:
the enhancement of resident participation in planning for new communities ‗. . .
when virtually no residents remain to participate.‘‖) (quoting Jerry J. Salama,
The Redevelopment of Distressed Public Housing: Early Results from HOPE VI
Projects in Atlanta, Chicago, and San Antonio, 10 HOUS. POL‘Y DEBATE 95,
131 (1999)); Lynn E. Cunningham, Managing Assets/Managing Families:

GREENE

4/16/2009 4:25 PM

THE HOPE VI PARADOX

219

paid to who is living in the units or if there is any continuity in
tenancy. 118 Tenant-based evaluation would include factors that are
better aligned with the goals of HOPE VI. For instance, it would be
useful to know if a greater percentage of tenants have secured
gainful employment after development, or what percentage of
tenants are taking advantage of the better schools and community
services that were a part of the redevelopment, or whether tenant
governance groups have developed, and if so, whether there is
equal representation from market-rate renters and subsidized
tenants.119
The four goals of HOPE VI all involve individual effects that
should be identifiable in the tenants after redevelopment. 120 To
determine the success of a development, HUD should evaluate
whether behavioral patterns are altered by comparing the same
low-income tenants before and after redevelopment. To determine
if community rules are being enforced, HUD should evaluate
whether low-income tenants are taking part in creating and
observing community norms. Finally, to determine whether lowincome tenants are taking advantage of better schools and jobs,
HUD should look at the status of the same tenants before and after
the redevelopment.121

Reconceptualizing Affordable Housing Solutions for Extended Families, 11 J.
AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 390 (2002).
118
See Bennett, supra note 53, at 265–75. However, HUD is not alone in
making this error. See Zielenbach, supra note 9, at 48–56 (using data from eight
HOPE VI developments to compare and contrast the effects on the
neighborhoods). However, the author fails to take into consideration the
different populations that live in each development before and after
reconstruction.
119
See Salsich, supra note 110, at 591–93 (arguing that although proof can
be offered that middle income persons can be attracted to HOPE VI
developments, this still does not address whether or not resources are being
misallocated to draw these new people into developments).
120
See Brophy & Smith, supra note 49, at 6.
121
See generally Brenda Bratton Blom, Can the Working Poor Afford
Decent Housing?, 14 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 131
(citing the connection between housing and employment, which makes these
problems interdependent at a federal aid level).
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HOPE VI funding is premised on the existence of transferable
behavioral characteristics through mixed-income housing, but
when HUD evaluates how effective the funding has been there is
no analysis of whether or not tenants from different income groups
are interacting, or if any behavioral changes are taking place. 122 In
fact, the PHA will receive a better evaluation from HUD by
dispersing low-income tenants, who are less likely to pay their
rents, and increasing market-rate units, which will keep its
incoming resources high in relation to its operating expenses. 123 As
it happens, that is exactly what occurred in the three examples
described above. 124
This dispersal of lower income tenants shifts the responsibility
of building public housing structures from the federal government
to the surrounding municipality. 125 In doing so, the federal
government provides physical housing for a small percentage of
the people that once lived in a given development, while providing
subsidies to the remainder that qualify for subsidized housing to
compete in the private housing market. This places a greater
122

See Bennett, supra note 53, at 298 (arguing that HOPE VI achieves the
contradictory goal of increasing resident participation in planning when virtually
no residents remain to participate).
123
See District of Columbia Housing Authority, supra note 80, (―The
Townhomes on Capitol Hill receives no subsidy and has maintained a budget
surplus each of the three years of its operation. The units sold very quickly,
supporting the mixed-income concept shared by all DCHA HOPE VI sites, and
the co-op continues to receive daily calls from people interested in purchasing a
unit despite the absence of any advertising campaign.‖).
124
See id.; Vitullo-Martin, supra note 66 (noting that the Atlantic Housing
Authority demolished old units, changed mixture of tenants, and now scores a
perfect 100 on HUD‘s assessment).
125
See Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Saving Our Cities: What Role Should the
Federal Government Play?, 36 URB. LAW. 475, 513 (2004) (―In many
metropolitan areas, the supply of housing, both for sale and rental that is
affordable to moderate and middle income families, as well as low income ones,
and is located in reasonable proximity to those families‘ jobs has decreased
substantially. The private sector has not been picking up the slack, in part
because demand coupled with exclusionary zoning policies is driving the private
sector to focus more on housing for upper-middle and upper income households.
A new federal production program is warranted because of this growing gap in
supply.‖).
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burden on the surrounding housing market because there are more
tenants competing for the same amount of affordable housing
opportunities.126 While the federal government pays rent subsidies
for the displaced tenants through Section 8 vouchers, it is no longer
responsible for the capital investment required to create the
physical housing structures.127 Thus, in areas where affordable
housing is already scarce, the federal government uses funds that
are supposed to provide housing for the neediest people and
instead relies on the chosen municipalities to have sufficient
structural resources in place to house the displaced. 128 The
underlying problem is that HOPE VI is funded in the belief that
public housing structures will be created and revitalized, but in
practice only a small percentage is reserved for public housing
while the majority is dedicated to market-rate units.
PART III—FACTORS THAT LEAD TO SUSTAINABLE SUCCESS
HUD has acknowledged that income-mixing alone will not
consistently produce increased employment options and
opportunities toward upward mobility for low-income tenants.129
That being the case, HUD must either be more realistic with its
goals and expectations when funding public housing
developments, or it must factor investment in employment training
and placement into the costs and application process for federal
housing funding.

126

See John J. Ammann, Housing Out the Poor, 19 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L.
REV. 309, 320 (2000) (arguing that HOPE VI has diminished the overall stock of
public housing while there has been an overall increase in the number of people
in need of subsidized housing).
127
See Bezdek, supra note 15, at 67–71.
128
Id. at 64 (discussing the differences between displacement via public
and private means, particularly the remedies that are available to government
when it displaces residents). Bezdek‘s discussion includes various remedies
including site selection, notice, public participation, and compensation offers.
However, none of these remedies are utilized nearly enough with public housing
residents because they do not hold any property rights to their dwellings.
129
See Brophy & Smith, supra note 49, at 3.
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Encouraging public housing residents to attain a more stable
foothold in society remains a worthy goal for HUD.130 The
administration of public housing should be of a forward-looking
nature, and, where possible, residents should live in an
environment that is conducive to upward mobility. Placing
subsidized residents alongside market-rate tenants has not
consistently borne the results that proponents of mixed-income
housing have hoped, but there are other examples of public
housing that have shown more positive results for the individual
tenants.131 HUD should identify and examine these models so it
can use funding to emulate conditions that have proven to lead to
tenant empowerment.132 It is important to note, however, that these
developments often grew organically without the benefit of HUD
oversight, or even in spite of HUD regulations. 133 To some extent,
HUD may have to trust the individual developments when
administering funds and accept the failures that come with less
oversight in return for greater potential success for the
developments that flourish.
A. Orchard Gardens – A Successful Model
One development that has been regarded as a successful use of
HUD funds to create benefits for individual tenants while also
130

See generally Salsich, Jr., supra note 125, at 508–10.
See, e.g., Fitzpatrick, supra note 35, 439–41 (citing Cleveland‘s
Cuyahoga development as a rare success for HOPE VI, not because of the
efficacy of typical HOPE VI goals but because part of the development was
turned into a frozen food packaging plant to create job opportunities, and a
social services ―mall‖ was developed to service residents as well as the
surrounding community); Henry W. McGee, Jr., Equity and Efficacy in
Washington State‟s GMA Affordable Housing Goal, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL‘Y
539 (2000) (St. Louis‘s Murphy Park development is cited as a success with
high levels of resident involvement, including setting screening criteria for
residents and working with the local community to help plan a new school and
community facilities.).
132
See Bezdek, supra note 15, at 97–113 (providing a detailed description
of ways to increase tenant participation, empowerment and stakeholding in
public housing developments).
133
See Fitzpatrick, supra note 35, at 439–41.
131
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benefiting the surrounding municipality is the Orchard Gardens
development in Boston.134 Orchard Commons and Orchard
Gardens are located in the Dudley Square area of Roxbury in
southwest Boston.135
By the Boston Housing Authority‘s (―BHA‖) own account,
Dudley Square was considered one of the worst areas in Boston
through the 1980‘s and into the early 1990‘s.136 Crime was
rampant, businesses had relocated, and there was almost no
commercial investment in the area.137 What remained was a
completely isolated pocket of property where subsidized tenants
lived in dilapidated housing units. 138 Moreover, the disinvestment

134

PETER MEDOFF & HOLLY SKLAR, STREETS OF HOPE: THE FALL AND
RISE OF AN URBAN NEIGHBORHOOD (South End Press 1994) (recounting the
challenges and successes of the Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative);
Michelle Estrin Gilman, Poverty and Communitarianism: Toward a
Community-Based Welfare System, 66 U. PITT. L. REV. 721, 790–93 (2005)
(noted as the Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative); Zielenbach, supra note 9,
at 56–66 (positive review of HOPE VI and, specifically, an analysis of Orchard
Park and the DSNI); Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative, DSNI Historic
Timeline, http://www.dsni.org/timeline.shtml (last visited Oct. 29, 2008)
[hereinafter DSNI Timeline].
135
See generally Boston Housing Authority, Planning and Real Estate
Development: Orchard Gardens,
http://www.bostonhousing.org/detpages/deptinfo155.html (last visited Oct. 29,
2008); Boston Housing Authority, Development Information: Orchard Gardens,
http://www.bostonhousing.org/detpages/devinfo43.html (last visited Oct. 29,
2008).
136
Boston Housing Authority, Planning and Real Estate Development:
Orchard Gardens, http://www.bostonhousing.org/detpages/deptinfo155.html
(last visited Oct. 29, 2008) (―When the HOPE VI application for Orchard Park
was submitted to HUD, Orchard Park was considered one of the most severely
distressed developments in the BHA‘s portfolio. Its buildings were dilapidated,
its name synonymous with crime, and its residents were isolated from
everything around them. In fact, the distress at Orchard Park had spread into the
surrounding neighborhoods and they, too, had fallen into a state of disrepair and
abandonment.‖). See generally MEDOFF & SKLAR, supra note 134, at 32
(describing an examination by the Boston Redevelopment Authority which
reported the ―devastation of housing in the area‖).
137
MEDOFF & SKLAR, supra note 134, at 23–35.
138
Id.
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meant that there were no jobs in the area. 139 Thus, once tenants
began living in Orchard Gardens, there were very few
opportunities to improve their circumstances by obtaining
employment and self-sufficiency.
These conditions are typical of developments that have been
categorized as blighted, the same conditions that HOPE VI was
created to remedy. 140 However, what were once abandoned parcels
are now over 400 new affordable homes, community centers, and a
new school, among other developments. 141 In addition, more than
500 housing units have been rehabilitated. 142 Most importantly,
this development has taken place without displacing a majority of
the tenants.143 This success, on terms that are acceptable to
developers as well as low-income tenants, was the result of using
HOPE VI funding to supplement the efforts of a well-organized
tenants association rather than to disperse the residents of a
development and artificially create a mixed-income neighborhood.
An important factor in this success is that, despite the long
period of decline, Dudley Square has had a consistent history of
grassroots activism. The Orchard Park Tenants Association
(―OPTA‖) was formed to advocate for additional resources and
attention from the Boston Housing Authority. 144 In the mid-1980‘s,
members of the OPTA combined with other local advocates to
create the Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative (―DSNI‖), an
organization designed to improve living conditions in Dudley
Square and the greater Roxbury area. 145
DSNI‘s first campaign was to mobilize area residents and bring
attention to illegal trash dumping that was occurring in their
neighborhood.146 This organization was so effective at channeling
139

Id. at 23–24.
See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
141
Maureen Mastroieni, Collaborative and Market-driven Approaches to
Economic Development and Revitalization, 32 REAL ESTATE ISSUES 1, 47
(2007).
142
Id.
143
Id.
144
See MEDOFF & SKLAR, supra note 134, at 162.
145
Id. at 37–65.
146
Id. at 67–87.
140
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resident anger into protests and positive publicity that Boston‘s
mayor eventually stepped in to meet their demands. 147
Significantly, this was an initial step with which DSNI began to
demonstrate that the neighborhood was willing to take
responsibility for its own affairs and work with the local
government to ensure that resources were directed towards the
community.
These relatively modest results created a foundation on which
to rebuild the community. In 1987, DSNI created a revitalization
plan that focused on redeveloping its community without
displacing residents.148 It worked to form strategic partnerships
with organizations in both the government and the private sector,
winning support by showing that its plan could be beneficial for
the greater municipality as well as the residents of its
community. 149 In 1988, it became the only community group in the
nation to be granted eminent domain power.150 Credibility was
earned through grassroots organization and outreach to political
and local business leaders, and this led to identifiable tenant
empowerment.151
The efforts of DSNI did not miraculously turn Dudley Square
around overnight, but it did attract positive publicity for the
neighborhood.152 Over time, businesses began to reinvest in the
area.153 Once the Boston Housing Authority received HOPE VI
funding in 1995, DSNI was enough of a presence that one of its
founding organizations—the Orchard Park Tenants Association—

147

Id. at 84–85.
See Mastroieni, supra note 141, at 49.
149
Id.
150
See MEDOFF & SKLAR, supra note 134, at 126–27 (―To acquire this
power, DSNI reorganized as an urban development corporation to acquire the
properties and a community land trust to ensure that the properties would be
held in perpetuity for the benefit of the residents of their community.‖); Gilman,
supra note 129, at 793; DSNI Timeline, supra note 137; see generally MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 121A, § 2 (2008).
151
See MEDOFF & SKLAR, supra note 134, at 187–89.
152
Id. at 86–87; See generally Mastroieni, supra note 135.
153
Zielenbach, supra note 9, at 57–59, 64, 65.
148
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was invited to take an active role in the redevelopment effort.154 At
this point, DSNI efforts had improved the community enough to
convince private investors that a financing plan, along with a
HOPE VI grant, could turn the community around as well as
providing a return for investors.155 Crime and drugs were still a
problem, and the community was still considered blighted.
However, the activities of the DSNI showed a spark of potential,
and with HOPE VI funding, the positive local involvement
encouraged former residents who had been involved in the change
to stay in the community after the buildings were razed and rebuilt.
The success of Orchard Gardens is different from other success
stories that HUD publicizes in that the efforts of the low-income
residents were encouraging businesses to reinvest in the area
before any federal funding was granted. This meant that the HOPE
VI grant could be used to parlay that interest into private financing.
In the examples that were mentioned earlier, private investors were
interested because gentrification was in the process of pushing
low-income tenants out of the area. In those cases, the HOPE VI
grant hastened the process of gentrification and attracted
businesses because efforts were being made to change the
demographics of the neighborhood. On the other hand, in Orchard
Park, the HOPE VI grant capitalized on a foundation that had
already been established by a well-organized and active tenants
organization. Businesses had begun to come back to the area
because of the current residents, rather than in spite of them. The
businesses were then willing to continue developing what had been
started.
HUD‘s methods for evaluating improvement in developments
generally do not take into account this type of tenant input,156 but it
is that very factor that makes Orchard Park a sustainable
development which incorporates the needs of the subsidized
tenants, as well as addressing the financial health and appearance
of the development as a whole. Rather than dispersing low-income
154

See Roberta L. Rubin, Take and Give, SHELTERFORCE, Feb. 29, 2008,
available at http://www.shelterforce.org/article/print/215/; see generally Boston
Housing Authority, Orchard Gardens, supra note 136.
155
See Zielenbach, supra note 9, at 62–63.
156
See supra text accompanying notes 115–28.
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tenants, effectively making them the problem of surrounding
neighborhoods to either house or exclude, tenants must be
incorporated into the process so that private investment is attracted
by the community, rather than by the promise of gentrification and
an incoming middle class set of consumers.
B. Important Ingredients for Success: Organic Foundations
and Long Term Sustainability
Orchard Gardens demonstrates that the administration of
HOPE VI funds can be successfully based on an organic
foundation that protects the needs of subsidized tenants while the
development is integrated into the surrounding metropolitan area.
If HUD were to attempt to use Orchard Gardens as a model for
public housing, the first step would involve changing the way that
HUD evaluates developments. It must place a premium on
effective tenant leadership and the strength of the community in
any given housing project.157 Moreover, once developments are
recognized for this vital self-determination, HUD would have to be
willing to administer funds with a loose regulatory framework so
that the project could become, at least to some degree, tenant
driven. This is the only proven way that tenant interests will be
meaningfully factored in along with the local business and
government interests that currently dominate the HOPE VI funding
process.158
While HOPE VI claims to include tenant participation, critics
routinely dismiss these efforts as token gestures with no real

157

See Bezdek, supra note 15, at 86–91 (explaining the importance of
community); id. at 97–113 (describing how resident inclusion can be practically
accomplished).
158
See generally Kristen David Adams, Promise Enforcement in Public
Housing: Lessons From Rousseau and Hundertwasser, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1073
(2002); Kristen David Adams, Can Promise Enforcement Save Affordable
Housing in the United States?, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 643 (2004) (setting forth
the idea of ―promise enforcement,‖ a creation by the author, as an alternative,
and possibly a development of HOPE VI principles to better serve affordable
housing tenants).
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meaning. 159 On the one hand, tenants are not able to participate
throughout the redevelopment process when they are relocated and
never return to the development.160 In particular, the uncertainty
over who will be invited back makes it particularly difficult for
tenants to meaningfully contribute to the development plan. On the
other hand, tenants that do retain residency rights are given very
little authority, so their input in the project does not result in any
meaningful benefit.161 Resident boards are created and make
recommendations, but it is difficult to find cases where their input
has significantly shaped the course of a HOPE VI development.162
The important difference in Orchard Gardens was that, through
grassroots organizations, tenants were a determinative factor in the
redevelopment.
CONCLUSION
HOPE VI was a step in the right direction, to some degree,
because it recognized and directly addressed the problem that had
plagued HUD‘s previous attempts to provide subsidized housing—
completely isolated centers of poverty that inevitably fostered
crime and drove out businesses. Moreover, it recognized that by
incorporating private financing in public housing and urban
revitalization efforts—a cornerstone of HOPE VI‘s mission—both
low-income tenants as well as residents in the surrounding
municipality stood to benefit. The examples I have discussed show
that, at best, private financing offers a flexibility in funding that
can bolster a solid community foundation. At worst, it can cause
the principals of a redevelopment effort to lose sight of who the
159

See Bezdek, supra note 15, at 57–58; McFarlane, supra note 55, at 868
(criticizing the disconnect between the principle and practice of community
participation in economic development).
160
See supra text accompanying notes 115–28.
161
See Bennett, supra note 53, at 304 (describing the ostensible tenant
input that is required in HOPE VI developments but arguing that it practically
amounts to very little).
162
See Georgette C. Poindexter, Who Gets the Final No? Tenant
Participation in Public Housing Redevelopment, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y
656–79 (2000).
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beneficiaries should be. HUD‘s role should be to utilize these
creative financing options while protecting the interests of lowincome renters who rely upon federally subsidized housing. HUD
must recognize that while deconcentrating poverty by dispersing a
portion of the subsidized population may have short-term indirect
benefits (reducing urban blight, creating a more favorable
environment for businesses), this strategy in the long term creates a
larger burden on the surrounding metropolitan area and offers no
benefit for the majority of subsidized tenants. 163
Though my proposed course of action is difficult and would
require a shift in thinking for HUD as an agency, a move in this
direction would address a number of criticisms that HUD has faced
for decades. In particular, funding developments that are built from
grassroots movements will create a stronger foundation and selfinterest among tenants in the success of their own development. In
the long term, this would make the administration of funds more
efficient, because it is less likely that HUD would have to start
again from scratch in 15 or 20 years if a development fails. In
addition, having an established tenant leadership would ideally
improve the maintenance of units while providing opportunities for
tenants to collectively negotiate in their best interests on the same
footing as businesses and the local government.
Though some failures may be inevitable, if HUD funds
developments based on the strength of local tenants organizations,
it will encourage tenants elsewhere to get organized in order to
receive funding. As more developments are funded and a larger
sample set is created, individual factors that lead to successful
tenant leadership can be identified and utilized in training sessions.
Sharing responsibility for these developments, at least in part,
between the federal government and the affected tenants appears to
be the only way that low-income tenants can attain selfsufficiency.

163

See generally Bezdek, supra note 15, at 61–73 (discussing the calculus
of costs versus benefits during urban renewal, including the benefits expected by
local governments that may never materialize as well as the costs to displaced
residents).

